Politics
DOJ appeals order shielding election workers from prosecution threats
Judge Trina Thompson’s order, in force through Nov. 16, bars pressure on workers based solely on federal claims that voters are ineligible.
What to know
- The Justice Department on Saturday, October 31, appealed to the 9th Circuit a temporary restraining order issued Friday by U.S. District Judge Trina L. Thompson in San Francisco.
- The order bars federal officials from threatening or coercing election workers to halt, segregate or not count ballots solely because the government alleges a voter is ineligible.
- It also bars threats of prosecution against workers who process ballots under state and federal law.
- The order runs until 5 p.m. on November 16, nearly two weeks after the November 3 election. A preliminary-injunction hearing is set for November 13.
- An appeal is not a reversal: the order stays in effect unless a court changes it.
The Trump administration has taken its fight over federal pressure on election workers to the Ninth Circuit, challenging a temporary order issued days before the November 3 midterms. NBC News reported that the Justice Department filed the appeal Saturday, October 31. U.S. District Judge Trina L. Thompson signed the order Friday against the Justice and Homeland Security departments, Attorney General Todd Blanche and Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin, in a case brought by unions and civil rights organizations including SEIU, AFSCME, LULAC and the NAACP. Our report on Friday's ruling has more on the order itself.
The order is set to expire at 5 p.m. on November 16. Its central restriction concerns demands and prosecution threats based solely on the federal government's allegation that a registered voter is ineligible. That qualification defines the dispute: the court is addressing how federal officials pressure people administering an election, rather than deciding the citizenship or eligibility of every voter whose name appears on a government list.
For election offices, the immediate question is who can require a change in ballot handling and on what legal basis. For the administration, the appeal contests a restriction on its enforcement efforts. Those questions now overlap with a fast-moving court schedule, but an appeal, a temporary restraint and a final judgment are different legal events.
What does the order prohibit?
Thompson's eight-page order temporarily bars the defendants from threatening or coercing state and local election workers to stop processing a registered voter's ballot solely because federal officials allege that the voter is ineligible. It also prohibits demands, on that same basis, to remove particular registered voters from the rolls, withhold their ballots, segregate their ballots or decline to count them in the November 3 election.
Separate provisions address prosecution threats. Federal officials cannot threaten workers with criminal charges for refusing those demands or for processing and counting ballots in compliance with the state and federal laws governing election administration on the prohibited basis. The order's focus is therefore broader than a single letter but more specific than a ban on all federal election investigations.
That distinction matters operationally. A direction to put ballots aside changes how an election office processes votes even when the government describes separation as something short of cancellation. Thompson's order expressly covers segregation as well as noncounting. The legal concern extends to disruption of the required process, not simply to whether a ballot has been formally destroyed or invalidated.
Does the order decide who is eligible to vote?
The judge's account of the background describes federal demands, including October letters to county officials across California, involving people the administration considered potentially ineligible, including alleged noncitizens. The administration's stated purpose, as recorded in the order, was to stop unlawful voting. The plaintiffs argued that threats against workers complying with election law would instead interfere with lawful voting and administration.
Thompson found the plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claims and identified a risk of irreparable harm. Her analysis addressed the Voting Rights Act's protection against intimidation and the constitutional allocation of election responsibilities. Those are findings supporting emergency relief. They do not convert allegations about particular voters into established facts, or constitute a final trial judgment against the federal defendants.
The order likewise does not give election workers general immunity from criminal law. Its protection concerns the specified demands and threats when workers carry out election duties under applicable law. It does not establish that every name challenged by federal authorities belongs to an eligible voter. Resolving an individual's eligibility and deciding whether federal pressure is lawful remain distinct questions.
What must federal officials do?
The order contains affirmative instructions in addition to its prohibitions. Defendants must notify state, county and local governments that received relevant letters and lists that the demands and prosecution threats reflected in those communications have been enjoined. That requirement addresses the continuing influence of a letter already delivered; stopping future correspondence alone would not necessarily remove an existing threat.
The Justice Department must also inform the court about pending search-warrant applications, grand-jury subpoenas and other demands for election materials or testimony tied to the relevant lists. This is a disclosure requirement. Describing it as the cancellation of every subpoena or an across-the-board prohibition on investigations would go beyond the signed text.
Taken together, those provisions target both the pressure facing election workers and the court's ability to assess related federal actions. They also explain why the exact terms matter more than a general description that the administration was ordered to stop interfering with elections.
What's next
NBC's updated report establishes that the administration filed an appeal, going beyond an earlier indication that it intended to challenge the order. Filing an appeal does not, by itself, demonstrate that an appellate court has reversed the ruling or granted a stay. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 distinguishes injunctive relief from judgments that receive an automatic pause and allows courts to address requests for a stay.
Under the timetable in Thompson's order, the defendants' response to the request for a preliminary injunction is due November 2, with an optional plaintiffs' reply November 5. A hearing is scheduled for November 13. The temporary restraint expires at 5 p.m. on November 16 unless subsequent court action changes the legal position.
That schedule extends beyond Election Day while leaving the merits for further proceedings. The development heading into Sunday is therefore an administration appeal against a defined temporary restraint, with longer-lasting relief still to be argued. Whether another court modifies those terms is a separate event requiring a new ruling, not a conclusion that follows automatically from the Justice Department's decision to appeal. The fight runs alongside other California election cases, including the subpoena dispute before a special master and the ballot ruling the department also appealed; see also federal plans for election monitors.
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*ARCHIVE PHOTO: The Phillip Burton Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in San Francisco, home of the Northern District of California, June 2025. Not the current event. Photo: Marincyclist / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0 (cropped).*
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Credit: Marincyclist / Wikimedia Commons. License: CC BY-SA 4.0. Source: file page.
